Ukraine, Iraq, and Finland
What the invasions of Iraq in 2003 and Finland in 1939 can tell us about Ukraine in 2022
A major theme of Russian history is military unpreparedness and poor initial performances with the outbreak of hostilities. The ongoing war in Ukraine appears to be in keeping with this tradition. It should also go without saying that most reports during active combat actions are inaccurate. Both the Russians and Ukrainians have reason to diminish the enemy’s successes and inflate their own. Widespread videos of destroyed military equipment are touted as evidence of Russian military ineptitude and Ukrainian valor. This might be true in some, or even many, instances but these early reports from the first three days of fighting probably do not express the reality of Russian military power or how the campaign will end.
Many Americans will remember the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. This was touted as a “shock and awe” campaign, designed to quickly overwhelm Iraqi defenses, seize the capital, and change the Hussein regime. Today this campaign is cited as an example of the brilliance of the American military. But that campaign, like almost all in history, had major setbacks. An American helicopter attack on an Iraqi Republican Guard division failed with four aircraft shot down or destroyed and almost all of them damaged. A US maintenance unit was ambushed and the unit captured; the famous Private Jessica Lynch was among them. Embarrassing videos of the captured Americans showed the soldiers expressing that they weren’t in Iraq to hurt people and seemingly unprepared for combat. Friendly fire incidents killed US Marines and heavy fighting stalled the American advance around Nasiriyah. A sandstorm halted the 101st Air Assault division for three days. All this is to say that this is what war looks like. Americans have been lulled into an ease of military operations from years of high tech airstrikes, drones, and highly-trained special operations forces. Large scale military operations are often slow, cumbersome, and require flexibility to adapt to the enemy’s plan. Isolated videos of captured demoralized Russian soldiers or wrecked equipment are anecdotal at best and misleading at worst.
This all calls to mind another military operation from Russian history: the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40. Three months after the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the Soviet Union demanded security guarantees and territory from its Finnish neighbor. Finland refused and the Soviet Army invaded. The Soviet Army was vastly superior in terms of numbers and equipment but the Finns possessed many advantages the Ukrainians possess today: high morale, local knowledge of the geography, and international support. These Finnish advantages allowed them to hold off the Soviet invader for several months but the Russians adapted. After losing equipment, soldiers, and time, the Russians reorganized their forces and increased their numbers. Eventually they overwhelmed the Finnish defenses in April 1940 and imposed peace terms that were actually harsher than what they initially asked for. Finland was allowed its independence but it lost almost 10% of its territory. The Finns would ally with Germany in 1941 to regain their territory and avenge their losses. The Soviet struggles against Finland encouraged Hitler to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. Again the Soviets struggled with hundreds of thousands of soldiers surrendered, entire squadrons of aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and thousands of kilometers of territory were captured in weeks. But the Soviets rallied and in four years they had captured Berlin.
The Russian campaign in Ukraine is currently only utilizing a fraction of total Russian military power in the local area. The Russians also seem to be holding off on massed artillery fire, attacks on civilian infrastructure or population centers, or engaging in urban warfare with the exception of Kyiv. The civilian population is allowed to drive around and engage in conversation with Russian forces. There has probably been an edict to treat the Ukrainian populace nicely to avoid the possibility of resistance. That also explains why the electrical grids and internet still function throughout the country.
The Russian military doctrine is also derived from the Soviet: the reinforcement of success. This means that many lines of attack will begin with the expectation that some will fail. The reserves are then plugged only into the area that is meeting its objectives. This can give a defender the feeling of greater battlefield success but its illusory. If the Russians haven’t made much headway in the coming days it seems likely that the strategy will change and a more overwhelming force will be brought to bear. Russian attempts at paratrooper landings and a lightning strike on Kyiv imply they wish to end the war quickly with a decapitation strike. If this option is no longer on the table the Russians might shift to a more attrition style strategy, wearing down Ukraine’s outnumbered and under-trained forces through a greater reliance on firepower. The Ukrainians have valiantly held out thus far but this doesn’t mean they can do so forever. Western military support is limited to intelligence and supplies. While these are helpful, Russian numbers and firepower are likely to carry the day.
A political solution to the invasion is the best thing that Ukraine can hope for. It’s valiant defense won’t change any minds in Moscow but it has inspired people all over the world, hardened the resolve of NATO, and encouraged ordinary Ukrainians to fight for their country. Whatever kind of peace they impose on Ukraine, the Russians are likely now to be wary of future military options against Ukrainians in the future.